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The making of the Court's homosexual:
a queer reading of the European Court of
Human Rights' case law on same-sex
sexuality
DAMIAN A GONZALEZ-SALZBERG*
University of Sheffield, School of Law
1 Introduction
T he presence of same-sex sexuality before a court of law is far from being a novelty but
its understanding as a personal characteristic worthy of legal protection has a very short
history indeed. An important moment of this new tradition occurred in 1981 when the
European Court of Human Rights (the Court) decided the Dudgeon case. On this occasion
the Court ruled that the criminalisation of same-sex sexuality in private was a violation of
the right to respect for private life, protected by the European Convention on Human Rights
(the Convention). 1 The Court has since become the leading international judicial body
dealing with the recognition of sexual orientation as a relevant topic of human rights law.
The Court's developing case law on same-sex sexuality has been thoroughly studied
by many authors. From a traditional liberal perspective, the works of Harris and
Wintemute have highlighted the importance of the case law of the Court.2 More recent
analyses conducted by Grigolo and Johnson have ventured to critically evaluate the
Court's case law using a constructionist theoretical approach, focusing on the discursive
power of the jurisprudence. 3 Nonetheless, queer theory as a methodological tool for
analysing the legal discourse of the Court has rarely been used.4 This article seeks to
rectify that gap in the literature.
Lecturer in law, University of Sheffield d.a.gonzalez salzberg@sheffield.ac.uk. My thanks go to Professor Carl
F Stychin, Dr Aleardo Zanghellini and Dr Michele Grigolo for their comments on previous drafts of this
article. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer for their very helpftul suggestions.
1 D-dg0o v UK App no 7525/ 76 4 EHRR 149.
2 D J Harris, M OBoyle, C Warbrick and E Bates, Law of rhe Europea Cooveiou o H ,a Rghr (OUP 2009),
R Wintemute, Sexual Oriewatiou azd Humaz Rghr: The Uoired Stares Couzjrzrzioz, the Eulop a, CoveIroti, azd the
Calzadialz Charier (Clarendon Press 1997), R Wintemute, 'From "Sex Rights" to "Love Rights": Partnership
Rights as Human Rights' in N Bamforth (ed), Sex Rz ghr: The Oxford Amoesy Lectures 2002 (OUP 2005)
186 224.
3 M Grigolo, 'Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject (2003) 14(5) European
Journal of International Law 1023-44, P Johnson, 'An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human
Personality: Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights' (2010) 10(1) Human
Rights Law Review 67 97, P Johnson, Ho,' oi xay a7d the Europeaz Cour of Humaz Rghr (Routledge 2013).
4 The works of Wayne Morgan and Michele Grigolo appear as the rare exceptions to the lack of queer analysis
of the Courts case law: W Morgan, 'Queering International Human Rights Law m C Stychin and D Herman
(eds), Sexuality i the LegalAreua (Athlone Press 2000) 208 25, Grigolo (n 3).
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Queer theory adopts a post-structuralist understanding of identities that contest their
stability, challenging not only the fixity of categories such as sex, gender and sexuality, but
also the traditional construction of these characteristics as opposed binaries. 5 Working
within this framework, the article will perform a deconstructive reading of 40 rulings on
same-sex sexuality issued by the Court during three decades, from the Dudgeon case in 1981
to the X and Others case in 2013. The aim of the analysis is to illustrate how the Court's case
law has discursively created the Courts homosexual In particular, the use of queer theory will
highlight the impact of the regulatory power of human rights law on the pejormative
character of sexual identities. 6 The analysis will certainly not exhaust the potential of
queerly thinking human rights law, but it will draw attention to the relevance of queer theory
for the analysis of the Court's homosexual past and future.
Following Butler, it can be understood that intelligible subjects are created through an
exclusionary process that has, as a logical need, the simultaneous creation of the non-subject,
the 'Other'.7 The construction of the Court's homosexual has been no exception. It has been
shaped within the Court's case law as the opposite counterpart of the true subject of human
rights law, the heterosexual, the only one entitled to the full enjoyment of human rights.
Within three decades of rulings, the Court has not offered a legal definition of
homosexuality. Instead, the Court has been exercising the authority of the law, constituting
and regulating the legal meaning of sexual identities. 8 It is through the Court's case law that
the Court's homosexual has been created, acquiring the characteristics granted to him/her
by the Court.
The analysis of the rulings dealing with same-sex sexuality will be conducted by
resorting to seven deconstructive binaries that have been present - either implicitly or
explicitly in the Court's case law.9 The seven dichotomies to be used in the deconstruction
of the judgments are: heterosexual/homosexual; legal/illegal; inside/out; private/public;
equal/ different; couple/ uncouple; and self/other. Even though just a few of these binaries
explicitly recognise the lesser value of one of the terms involved, they all share this
characteristic. As clearly expressed by Sedgwick, many seemingly symmetrical binary
oppositions actually subsist in a dynamic relation according to which one of the terms is
nothing but subordinated to the other. In fact, the true meaning of the two terms can only
be understood by their tacit hierarchical interrelation. 10
In brief, the article will engage in a queer analysis of the rulings on same-sex sexuality
issued by the Court between 1981 and 2013 in order to illustrate the creation process of the
Court's homosexual. Section 2 of the article will offer a theoretical understanding of the
categorical approach the Court has adopted for conceiving the legal sexuality of individuals.
Section 3 will present the analysis of 24 judgments of the Court through three binary pairs.
It will focus on how the protection the Court has offered to its homosexual has shifted
5 A Jagose, Queer Theou (Melbourne University Press 1996) 3, C Stychin, Lawy Desire: Sexuaity and the Lrnit of
Justice (Routledge 1995) 141, J Weeks, The Language of Sexualiy (Routledge 2011) 146.
6 Morgan (n 4) 217 18, A Zanghellini, 'Queer, Antinormativity, Counter normativity and Abjection' (2009)
18(1) Griffith Law Review 1 16, 6.
7 J Butler, Bodies rha Mater (e book Taylor & Francis 2011) xiii.
8 Stychin (n 5) 156, N Beger, 'Queer Readings of Europe: Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation and the
(Im)potency of Rights Politics at the European Court of Justice' (2000) 9(2) Social and Legal Studies 249 70,
264.
9 For the use of deconstructive binaries as a methodological tool, see: E Kosofsky Sedgwick, Episremology of he
Closet (University of California Press 1990) 9 11, C Stychin, 'Couplings: Civil Partnership in the United
Kingdom' (2005) 8 New York City Law Review 543 72.
10 Sedgwick (n 9) 9 10.
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through the years, allowing his/her journey from the privacy of the closet to the public
sphere. Section 4 will resort to two binary oppositions in order to analyse the remaining 16
rulings of the Court. It will show how the Court's case law has used both the concession
and denial of human rights to create its homosexual as the inferior counterpart of the
heterosexual subject. Section 5 will summarise the main findings of the analysis performed
and propose a potential way forward.
2 The categorical approach to homosexuality (heterosexual/homosexual)
An essential departing point of a queer analysis is the heterosexual/homosexual binary
which represents the existence of human sexuality as only two compulsory and contradictory
options. Queer theory has shown the peculiar nature of this binary, since its first term is
presented as the category to which everyone is supposed to belong; while the belonging to
the second group only takes place as an exclusion, by the inability of the subject to fit into
the first one. 11 Therefore, even though the Court's homosexual is supposedly presented as
the stable counterpart of the heterosexual subject, 12 his/her legal existence is marked from
the outset by the impossibility of fitting into the right(ful) side of the binary
Furthermore, the binary division of sexual identity not only consolidates heterosexuality
as the background norm, since the two options offered are not of the same value, but also
restricts the diversity of sexuality.13 In fact, the Court has assumed that every single
individual could be perfectly fitted into one (and only one) side of the binary Other
possible options have appeared in the Court's case law only in a tangential way and have
never been a part of the holding of a decision.
For example, the term 'bisexual' has sporadically appeared in the rulings of the Court,
but only when quoting fragments of domestic decisions or international soft law
instruments; 14 and an undefined reference to 'pansexual' individuals appeared in the
partially dissenting vote of Judge Walsh in the Dudgeon case itself 15 It was not until the year
2010 that the Court showed a degree of willingness to open the binary, when it made
reference to gays, lesbians and any other sexual minority.16 Nonetheless, this simple
reference has not had any legal consequences in the Court's case law so far.
On the other hand, it seems to be mandatory for every individual before the Court to
have a sexual orientation and, therefore, to take a place on one of the sides of the binary
The Court has implicitly answered in the affirmative the appealing question posed by Gross:
does each person have a sexual orientation? 17 Indeed, the complete absence of any
reference to 'asexuality' within the Court's case law helps in proving the belief in sexual
orientation as a compulsory personal characteristic.
The fact that sexual orientation is mandatory, coupled with the existence of only two
possible options, ensures that every single individual is placed on one of the sides of the
heterosexual/homosexual binary This categorical approach delineates a restrictive
11 D Halperm, Saiut Foucault- Towards aGay Hagiograply (OUP 1997) 44.
12 Grigolo (n 3) 1030.
13 L C Backer, 'Queering Theory: An Essay on the Conceit of Revolution in Law' in L Moran, D Monk and
S Beresford (eds), LgalQueeie: Leibian, Gay ad TragdrLegalStudies (Cassell 1998) 188.
14 Schererv Swirze rawd (Case 19/1993/414/493) ECHR 23 March 1994, para 11, Lasky aod 0ther v UKApp nos
21627/93, 21628/93, 21974/93 24 EHRR 39, paras 11 and 47, TN v De wark App no 36517/08 (ECHR 20
January 2011), para 65, EG v UKApp no 41178/08 (ECHR 28 November 2011), para 45.
15 Ddgeon v UK (n 1), dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh.
16 Alksy y Russia App nos 4916/07, 25924/08, 4599/09 (ECHR 21 October 2010), para 84.
17 A Gross, 'Queer Theory and International Human Rights Law: Does Each Person have a Sexual Orientation?'
(2007) 101 American Society of International Law and Procedure 129 32.
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conception of human sexuality within the Court's case law, acting as a clear display of the
regulatory power of the law over the Court's homosexual. The adoption of a categorical
approach has allowed the Court to regulate, contain and constrain the legal sexuality of its
homosexual. 18 In particular, this limited conception of sexuality provided a clear departing
point for the construction of the Court's homosexual as the private and inferior counterpart
of the heterosexual subject, as will be discussed in sections 3 and 4 of this article.
3 From the private closet to the public streets
The following three binaries are aimed at deconstructing the developing protection that the
Court has offered its homosexual through time. In particular, the analysis will show the 30-
year journey of the Court's homosexual from the secrecy of the closet to the public sphere.
The binaries will illustrate the Court's reactions to the swinging tempers of governments
that, at different times, have forced the Court's homosexual into secrecy; pushed him/her
out of the closet; and censored him/her on the streets.
A. LEGALILLEGAL
In almost half the cases concerning the Court's homosexual, the question to be answered
was whether same-sex sexuality was to be considered criminal or lawful by the states. The
first three cases introducing the Court's homosexual were Dudgeon, Noris and Modinos. In
each of these cases the Court ruled that the mere existence of legislation criminalising private
sexual activity between adult men was a violation of the Convention.19 Similarly, the later
ruling in the ADT case affirmed that legislation criminalising consensual sexual acts between
more than two adult men was also a violation of the right to respect for private life.2 0
Therefore, the Court decided that its homosexual was entitled to a private sphere
protected from the unjustified intrusions of the state. In particular, the Court's homosexual
had the right to engage in same-sex acts, as long as those were performed by consenting
adults in the secrecy of their home. Nonetheless, the protection granted to its homosexual
was only a bare minimum, since the Court specifically stated in the Dudgeon case that
decriminalisation did not imply approval. 21 This unnecessary comment, made in the context
of the case, can only be understood as either condoning a negative view of same-sex
sexuality by the community, or as actually expressing the Court's rejection of its
homosexual.
Furthermore, for over a decade after Dudgeon, the legality of same-sex sexuality was still
contentious. Even if it could not be completely made illegal by the state, the Court did not
venture further than recognising a limited private legality. In fact, the Court has been
criticised for failing to recognise a needed difference between privacy and secrecy 22 The
legality of same-sex sexuality seemed to have depended on its secrecy and, therefore, it was
never truly lawful, but just kept unknown with the grace of the authorities.
18 C Stychin, 'Essential Rights and Contested Identities: Sexual Orientation and Equality Rights Jurisprudence in
Canada' (1995) 8 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 49-66, 56, L Gotell, 'Queering Law: Not by
Vriend' (2002) 17(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Junrisprudence 89 113, 108.
19 Dudgeou v UK (n 1) para 63, Norris v /relaudApp no 10581/83 13 EHRR 186, para 47, Modioi v Cyprus App
no 15070/89 16 EHRR 485, para 26.
20 ADT v UK App 35765/97 31 EHRR 33, paras 38 39. At the same time, the Court recognised the ability of
the government to regulate sexual acts in certain circumstances, in which looked like an implicit confirmation
of its ruling on the Laky case admitting the criminalisation of sado masochistic practices for the alleged
protection of health: Lajky a.d Ohen v UK (n 14) para 50.
21 Dudgeou v UK (n 1) para 61.
22 Johnson, An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality' (n 3) 86 7.
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The legal/illegal dilemma subsists at a certain level in the F case, decided by the Court
in 2004. The Court decided that the prohibition on criminalising same-sex sexuality did not
forbid extraditions to countries where the extradited person risked facing draconian
punishments for his/her sexual orientation, at least when a judicial conviction was unlikely
to take place.23 Consequently, the scope of the territorial jurisdiction of the Court also
acted as the limit between legal and illegal sexuality. When the border of the Court's
jurisdiction is crossed, the line that separates legality from illegality could also be erased,
without worrying the Court.
The Court shaped its homosexual through the legal/illegal dichotomy in a second group
of judgments, which dealt with a differential age of consent for same-sex and for different-
sex sexuality. The Court decided eight similar cases against the UK and Austria 24 and ruled
that the domestic legislation that established a differential age of consent was
discriminatory.25 The judgments stated that very weighty reasons needed to be offered in
order to justify a differential age of consent between same-sex and different-sex sexuality,
but such a justification did not exist in these cases. Consequently, the relevant age for sexual
consent was to be equal for the heterosexual subject and the Court's homosexual. In this
specific area, same-sex sexuality managed to acquire the same degree of legality as the
sexuality of the heterosexual.
Moreover, that finding was not modified by the contentious Santos Couo case. The Court
had to analyse a conviction for 'homosexual' acts with adolescents imposed by a Portuguese
tribunal at a time when the legislation established different criteria for the criminalisation of
same-sex and different-sex acts with minors. The Court did not find a violation because it
understood that the conviction had not been influenced by the difference in the legislation
concerning same-sex and different-sex sexuality.26 Therefore, the Santos Couo case did not
change the lawful status acquired by the sexuality of the Court's homosexual since the ruling
did not authorise the criminalisation of same-sex sexuality in circumstances in which
different-sex sexuality remained lawful.
To summarise, the Court granted its homosexual protection from criminal prosecution,
letting him/her rest on the safe side of the legal/illegal binary, as long as his/her sexuality
remained a private matter. However, there subsists a specific situation in which the Court's
homosexual might cross to the illegal side of the dichotomy: extradition outside the
jurisdiction of the Court.
B. INSIDEIOUT
This particular binary could be seen as the original deconstructive dichotomy, since every
opposite pair emulates the inside or outside dynamic. 27 Nonetheless, within queer theory,
this binary is peculiar, since the hierarchy of the terms is highly unstable. While 'out' is
23 Fv UKAppno 17341/03 (ECHR 22June 2004), para 10.
24 There had been a previous case before them (the Suherland case), but the Court did not take the opportunity
to analyse the merits of the case since the parties reached a friendly settlement: Suherland v UK App no
25186/94 (ECHR [Gq 27 March 2001), para 20.
25 L and V v Ausria App nos 39392/98, 39829/98 36 EHRR 55, SL v Ausria App no 45330/99 (ECHR 9
January 2003), LB r UKApp no 53760/00 39 EHRR 30, Wodi hka and Witflng rvAusja App nos 69756/01,
6306/02 41 BHRR 32, Ladner vAusra App no 18297/03 (ECHR 3 February 2005), Wof yr pApjrta App
no 5263/03 42 EHRR 3, HG and GB v Ausria App nos 11084/02, 15306/02 (ECHR 2 June 2005), RHF v
Austra App no 7336/03 (ECHR 19 January 2006).
26 Sanros Couro v PomgalApp no 31874/07 (ECHR 21 September 2010), paras 44 5.
27 D Fuss (ed), uid /Out: Lesbian Theone, Gay Theories (Routledge, 1991) 1.
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naturally subordinated for being the excluded term, it is revaluated, at the same time, for
representing the successful abandonment of the closet. 28
While the limited private legality of same-sex sexuality has already been stated, this
binary will help develop what has happened to the Court's homosexual when he or she has
dared step out of the closet, even if not voluntarily Between 1999 and 2009, the Court
decided a group of six cases in which coming out of the closet was also the cause of being
driven out of the military 29
In two original twin cases the Court analysed the UK's policy of purely heterosexual
armed forces, which included intrusive investigations into those suspected of
'homosexuality' and the consequent discharge of every individual identified as homosexual.
The UK's policy had the paradoxical effect of forcing members of the armed forces both
inside and outside the closet. If originally the 'homosexual ban' silenced the homosexual,
locking him or her inside the closet; simultaneously, it forced the homosexual to come out,
through invasive investigations into the constructed closet. The sexuality of the homosexual
was, at the same time, forced into self-censorship and disclosure.
The Court decided that both the homosexual ban policy and the investigations pursued
to establish the sexuality of those discharged were violations of the right to respect for their
private lives. 30 The Court understood that there were no convincing reasons for supporting
the exclusion of its homosexual from the armed forces and that the manner in which the
investigations were conducted was an unjustifiable interference into his/her private life.
In the eyes of the Court, being outside of the closet should not mean being outside the
military and it certainly did not mean being outside the protection of the Convention. This
judgment was reiterated in the analogous Beck and Perkins cases 31 and was the rationale for
reaching friendly settlements in the Brown and Hunt and Miler cases 32 after the Ministry of
Defence abandoned its contentious policy in the year 2000.
Since the military cases, the Court's homosexual became a less secret subject under the
law. These cases were the first ones that granted a protection of same-sex sexuality outside
the closet. The given protection was not public yet, as it was still granted through the right
to respect for private life, but it took place beyond the limits of the private home.
C. PRIVATEIPUBLIC
The majority of the Court's rulings dealing with same-sex sexuality have been decided from
a perspective centred on the right to respect for private life. The Court tended to base these
decisions on the understanding that sexuality is an important part of an individual's private
life.33 In fact, the Court's homosexual has been constructed as a private subject and that
privacy has been the reason behind the protection granted by the Court. 34
28 Fuss n 27) 4.
29 This type of military policy was certainly not unique to the UK, but mirrored previous policies of other
countries. Stychin (n 5) 91 100.
30 Lz iiPrean and Bekt v UKApp nos 31417/96, 32377/96 29 EHRR 548, paras 64, 104 and 105, Smith and
Gra, v UKApp nos 33985/96, 3986/96 29 EHRR 493, paras 71, 111 and 112.
31 BeA, Copp andBaZely v UKApp nos 48535/99, 48536/99, 48537/99 (ECHR22 October 2002).
32 Broy, v UKApp no 52770/99 (ECHR 29 July 2003), paras 13 14, Hunt andMilerv UKApp nos 10578/05,
10605/05 (ECHR 23 June 2009), paras 15 16.
33 Dudgeo v UK (n 1) para 60, ADT v UK (n 20) para 25, S ad Mar v UKApp nos 30562/04, 30566/04 (ECHR
[Gq 4 December 2008), para 66, Axd1SpdgerAG v G e ay App no 39954/08 (ECHR [Gq 7 February 2012),
para 83.
34 Johnson, 'An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality' (n 3) 93, 94 and 97. In particular,
Johnson highlights that the refusal to consider a violation of the right to freedom of expression in the Smith
and Grady case (n 30) reinforced the private character the Court grants to homosexuality.
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However, obtaining recognition through privacy is a limited strategy, since it silences the
actual existence of sexual diversity.35 The private/public division is the manner in which
Western law accommodates certain conducts that are neither prohibited nor truly accepted,
but that can be tolerated if secluded to the private sphere. 36 Certainly, the prohibition on
the criminalisation of same-sex sexuality in private still allows the law to disapprove of the
tolerated private conduct. 37
Conversely, allowing same-sex sexuality to appear in the public sphere implies its official
recognition by the law, as its existence can no longer be ignored. 38 Therefore, the
private/public character of same-sex sexuality is a decisive issue since, when same-sex
sexuality becomes a matter of public knowledge, the homosexual cannot be locked back
into the closet.
It was not until the years 2007 and 2010 that the Court allowed same-sex sexuality to
step out of the privacy closet into the public sphere. On those occasions, the Court dealt
with governmental bans imposed on marches organised to draw public attention to
discrimination based on sexual orientation, which took place in the capital cities of Poland
and Russia. 39 In both cases the Court found a violation of the right to assembly, coupled
with the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation.40 The Court understood
that the authorities' refusal to allow the events was an unjustified interference with the right
to peaceful assembly 41 Furthermore, the fact that the refused authorisations were linked to
strong opinions against same-sex sexuality of the mayors of the cities allowed the Court to
find the bans discriminatory in character.
42
In the Bacczkowski case, the Court actually recognised that sexual orientation was not just
a matter of privacy, but that the right to publicly express one's sexual orientation was also
protected by the Convention.43 This point was made even clearer in the Aleksyev case, in
which the Court reaffirmed the right of individuals to openly identify themselves as gays
and lesbians. 44
Moreover, the Court has recognised certain protection for its homosexual in the public
sphere since it has recently affirmed that freedom of expression does not include the liberty
to resort to homophobic hate speech.45 In the Vdeland case, the Court had to evaluate
whether a conviction imposed by a Swedish tribunal for homophobic speech was
compatible with the right to freedom of expression. The Court decided that the distribution
of leaflets stating that homosexuality was 'a deviant sexual proclivity' with 'a morally
destructive effect on the substance of society' justified the conviction imposed for serious
35 Morgan (n 4) 220 1.
36 L C Backer, 'Toleration, Suppression and the Public/Private Divide: "Homosexuals" through Military Eyes'
(1999) 34(3) Tulsa Law Journal 537 54, 538.
37 L C Backer, 'Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of Private Sexual Conduct, the
Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration' (1993) 45(5) Honda Law Review 755 802, 793.
38 Backer (n 36) 541, Backer (n 37) 789.
39 Before them, the Scher rcase also concerned freedom of expression but it was considered inadmissible by the
Court due to technical reasons: Schererv SWirze raod (n 14).
40 B, czko qki ad Othen v Poland App no 1543/06 48 EHRR 19, para 101, Aleksy y Rzjsia (n 16) para 110.
41 An almost identical ruling was rendered by the Court regarding similar circumstances in the subsequent
Ge dMrdo M case: Genderdoc M Moldova App no 9106/06 (ECHR 12 June 2012).
42 Bczkowikz ad Ohen Polan (n 40) para 68, 100 and 101, Aleksyev v Rusia (n 16) paras 86-8 and 109 10.
43 Bczkowikz ad Ohen - Polan (n 40).
44 Alekser r Russia (n 16) para 84.
45 Vdeland and Others v Sweden App no 1813/07 (ECHR 9 February 2012).
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and prejudicial allegations since it could be seen as necessary in a democratic society for the
protection of the reputation and rights of others.46
On the other hand, even though one's sexual orientation could be publicly expressed,
the same publicity concerning someone else's sexual orientation could be considered
insulting. In the year 2009, the Court decided the Porubova case, regarding the compatibility
of a criminal conviction with freedom of expression. The applicant had been convicted of
the publication of a newspaper article in which she referred to two Russian male politicians
allegedly involved in both a love story and an embezzlement scandal. She was convicted on
the grounds of insult and criminal libel solely for the reference to the gay love story.
The Court decided that the conviction imposed was a violation of freedom of
expression since it caused an interference with her right that did not appear to be necessary
in a democratic society.47 Nonetheless, the Court did not express any objections to the fact
that under the criminal legislation of the state, the public reference to someone's
homosexuality could be considered an insult that harmed his/her honour and dignity.48 The
questions that remain are: should the understanding of same-sex sexuality as harmful to a
person's honour and dignity be accepted by the Court? And what does it say about the value
given by the Court to same-sex sexuality?
In any case, the Court's homosexual has finally abandoned its limited private legality,
having made his/her appearance in the public sphere with the approval of the Court.
She/he can now publicly demand his/her human rights and is protected from
homophobic expressions. Nevertheless, same-sex sexuality still remains of inferior value.
The public discussion of the Court's homosexual's sexuality is not a violation of his/her
private life - as would be the discussion of heterosexuality - but it is an offence to his/her
honour and dignity.
4 The inferior value of homosexuality
The following two binaries are aimed at analysing how the denial and concession of human
rights by the Court have been used to construct its homosexual as the legal inferior
counterpart of the heterosexual subject. The binaries will show that the outcome of the
Court's discourse regarding same-sex sexuality is the confirmation of its homosexual as
different from the heterosexual subject, the true subject of human rights law. In fact, the
differential entitlement of rights has been used to create the orherness of the Court's
homosexual.
A. EQUALIDIFFERENT
As explained in section 2, the Court only contemplates two possible sexualities, which are
not of equal value. The Court's case law has actually created its homosexual by building on
a sexuality that was marked from the outset by the impossibility of fitting into the right(ful)
side of the heterosexual/homosexual binary. The equal/different opposition is the most
evident display of how the Court's homosexual is continually reshaped as unequal to the
heterosexual subject. This binary is present every time the Court analyses a case under the
prohibition of discrimination. When the Court justifies a differential treatment of
individuals based on their sexual orientation, it is shaping the Court's homosexual as
ontologically different from its heterosexual counterpart.
46 V delandand Others v Sweden (n 45) paras 8, 54 and 58 60.
47 Porphova v Rusia App no 8237/03 (ECHR 8 October 2009), paras 50 1.
48 Ibid paras 27 8.
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According to the Court, discrimination means differential treatment which is
detrimental to the enjoyment of human rights and lacks a reasonable and objective
justification. This means that a performed difference is discriminatory when it does not
pursue a legitimate aim, or when there is no reasonable proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised. 4 9 However, since the Convention does not
offer an autonomous protection from discrimination, the Court can only rule on
discrimination in conjunction with the enjoyment of another enunciated right.50
Regarding differential treatment based on sexual orientation, the Court's case law
affirms that very weighty reasons need to be offered to justify the distinction. 51 In other
words, sexuality is conceived as a category that should be relatively indifferent to the law.
However, the similarity of sexual subjects does not mean their equality, since their
difference is admitted when strong reasons justify it.
The Court has suggested the equality of the homosexual and heterosexual subjects,
affirming that a difference based on sexual orientation is discriminatory in itself.52 In its
own words, the Court stated that 'if the reasons advanced for a difference in treatment were
based solely on the applicant's sexual orientation, this would amount to discrimination
under the Convention'. 53
Nevertheless, the Court later pulled back from this statement, accepting differential
rights based on sexual orientation. The Court has highlighted that: 'there remain issues
where no European consensus has been reached, such as granting permission to same-sex
couples to adopt a child . . . and the right to marry, and the Court has confirmed the
domestic authorities' wide margin of appreciation in respect of those issues'. 54 This new
statement of the Court was by no means surprising, since the Court tends to allow states a
wide margin to determine domestic policy in cases lacking European consensus. 55 However,
it did mean that the Court was accepting distinctions based on sexual orientation, seven
months after having stated for the first time that they were per se discriminatory.
The Court has had the opportunity to analyse the equality/ difference binary, through
the prohibition of discrimination, on many occasions. As discussed above, the Court
considered the existence of a differential age of sexual consent to be discriminatory 56 and
the ban imposed on gay pride events.57 The Court has also found discriminatory certain
49 Saguii da Silva Mouta v Prtgal App no 33290/96 31 EHRR 47, para 29, EB v France App no 43546/02 47
EHRR 21, para 91, Schalk and Kopf vAutria App no 30141/04 53 EHRR 20, para 96.
50 On the 'parasitic' character of the prohibition of discrimination in the Convention, see: Harris et al (n 2)
577-615.
51 Sagi da Siva Moura v Portugal (n 49) para 36, Karner vAustria App no 40016 /98 38 EHRR 24, para 37, KoZak
v 1l/d App no 13102/02 51 EHRR 16, para 92.
52 Professor Stychin has argued that, if sexual orientation is considered to be immutable, then distinction based
on this characteristic should be considered to be unjustified since it is based in a characteristic beyond the
individual's control: Stychin (n 18) 59.
53 KoZak v Poland (n 51) para 92. This idea has been already sketched by the Court in its ruling EB v Frave, and
has been reaffirmed by the Court in G6derdo M v Moldova and X and Others vAusria: EB v Frave (n 49) para
93 GenderdocM v Moldova (n 41) para 51, Xad Orher v Ausria App no 19010/07 (ECHR [Gq 19 February
2013), para 99.
54 Aleksyev v Russia (n 16) para 83.
55 On the dynamic relation between the doctrines of European consensus' and 'margin of appreciation', see:
Harris et al (n 2) 8 14.
56 L and V vAusjria (n 25), SL vAusjria (n 25), BB v UK (n 25), Woditsjhka and Wifling vAusria (n 25), Ladner v
Auria (n 25), Wofyer vAusjria (n 25), HG and GB vAustrra (n 25), RI vAustria (n 25).
57 B cZkowski and Others v Poland (n 40), Alksev v R, iia (n 16).
380 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 65(4)
distinctions in the enjoyment of relationship rights, but not all of them, as will be discussed
in the next section.5
8
Furthermore, strong support for equality between the heterosexual and the Court's
homosexual can be found in the 2013 ruling on Eweida and Others. On that occasion, two of
the applicants had been sanctioned by their employers for refusing to perform certain duties
in favour of gays and lesbians, based on the claim that, according to their Christian beliefs
homosexuality was sinful and contrary to God's law. The first applicant, a public official,
refused to conduct civil partnership ceremonies; while the second applicant, a counsellor for
a private company, refused to provide sexual counselling to same-sex couples. The Court
decided that the sanctions imposed on the applicants and confirmed by the domestic courts
had been justified measures for the protection of the homosexual against discrimination. 59
Consequently, the Court validated the state's understanding that the homosexual was
equal enough to the heterosexual not to be treated detrimentally by either public bodies or
private companies due to his/her sexuality. And that held to be true even when the
differential treatment was based in religious convictions about the ungodly character of the
homosexual. In other words, the Court's homosexual was certainly not the same as the
Bible's homosexual.
On the other hand, the six cases dealing with parental rights are the paradigmatic
example of the shifting use of the equal/different binary in the Court's case law. The
Salgueiro da Silva Moura case was the first occasion on which the Court dealt with parental
rights of gays and lesbians and it was the first time that the Court stated that sexual
orientation was a prohibited category of discrimination.60 In its ruling, the Court decided
that the award of parental responsibility for a child based on the sexual orientation of one
of the parents was a violation of the prohibition of discrimination. 61 Similarly, in the JM
case, the Court ruled that the differential assessment of child support payments based on
the sexual orientation of the parent amounted to unlawful discrimination.62 Therefore, the
Court decided that sexual orientation could not be used as a criterion to justify the award
of parental custody, or a differential amount of child support.
Nevertheless, the relevance of sexual orientation for granting an adoption is a more
controversial topic and the Court has dealt with it on different occasions. According to the
Court, there are three types of adoption -individual adoption, second-parent adoption and
joint adoption - which raise different kinds of concerns. 63 In the first two cases, Frere and
EB, the Court dealt with individual adoption. In Frerre, the Court decided that the sexual
orientation of an individual could be a legitimate foundation to refuse authorisation to
adopt.64 It took the Court almost six years to overturn this criterion, but in the EB case the
Court decided that restricting the right to adopt based on the sexual orientation of the
applicant was indeed discriminatory.65
58 While distinctions on the right to succeed to a partner's tenancy and the right to benefit from a partner's health
insurance were considered to be discriminatory, the legal ban on same sex marriage was understood to be an
acceptable distinction: Kar, r vApjra (n 51), Kozak v Poland (n 51), PB aod JS v Austa App no 18984/02
(ECHR 22 July 2010), ha/k anid Kopf v Austra (n 49).
59 Eeida and Oh er v UK App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, 36516/10 (ECHR 15 January 2013), paras
106 and 110.
60 Salgueiro da Silva Moua v Portugal (n 49) para 36.
61 Ibid paras 35 6.
62 JM v UK App no 37060/06 53 EHRR 6, paras 55-8.
63 Xand Oh er vAusitra (n 53) para 100.
64 Fre tu vrace App no 36515/97 38 EHRR 438, para 42.
65 EB v Fraoce (n 49) para 96.
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The Court then dealt with the issue of second-parent adoptions in two subsequent
cases, Gas and Dubois and X and Others. First, in Gas and Dubois, the Court examined the
French prohibition of second-parent adoption for same-sex couples. In that case, two
women bound by civil partnership (pacte diil de so//dat/e (PACS)) had had a child through
assisted reproduction, but only the biological mother was recognised as parent of the child.
The domestic legislation only allowed married couples to share parental responsibility
through second-parent adoption, denying unmarried couples the same right. The Court
found the legislation to be compatible with the Convention, since it understood that both
same-sex and different-sex unmarried couples were treated equally.66
Nonetheless, the rationale of the Court's ruling minimised the fact that, while unmarried
different-sex couples could obtain shared parental responsibility by getting married, this
possibility was legally forbidden to same-sex couples. Therefore, the comparison made by
the Court masqueraded a concrete distinction as equality.67 The Court constructed the
single homosexual as equal to the single heterosexual, at the same time that it constructed
them both as different from the married heterosexual. However, this construction of single
individuals as different from married ones becomes especially relevant when the laws
prohibit homosexual individuals from marrying. Indeed, the fact that the homosexual could
only be a 'single' homosexual meant that she/he would always remain different from the
heterosexual.
The issue of second-parent adoption was revisited by the Court in the X and Others case.
The situation this time was different, since the legislation under analysis allowed both
married and single heterosexuals to adopt the children of their partners, while this type of
adoption was forbidden to the single homosexual, who was also legally unable to marry
his/her partner. The Court decided that it was discriminatory to deny second-parent
adoption to the homosexual, as long as this was allowed for the single heterosexual. 68
Nevertheless, the Court again found that it was not discriminatory to allow second-
parent adoption to the married heterosexual, but to deny both marriage and second-parent
adoption to the homosexual. 69 Consequently, the Court confirmed that its homosexual
should be formally conceived as equal to the single heterosexual. However, this equality was
apparent rather than real, since the single heterosexual was allowed to marry and become a
married heterosexual, an individual entitled to rights denied to the Court's homosexual.
Lastly, the issue of joint adoption by same-sex couples has not yet been considered by
the Court within an actual case. Nonetheless, the Court has rendered obiter dictum a clear
opinion on the matter. In the Alekseyev ruling, the Court stated that the issue of joint
adoption by same-sex couples lacked European consensus, gratuitously leaving the states a
wide margin of appreciation on the topic. 70
Therefore, according to the Court, it is discriminatory to forbid a single person to adopt
based on the sexual orientation of the prospective parent, but prohibiting that same
adoption based on the sexual orientation of both prospective parents is allowed. In other
words, the Court has affirmed that heterosexual and homosexual parents should be
66 Gas aod Dubois vFrace App no 25951/07 (ECHR 15 March 2012), para 73.
67 In fact, Johnson has expressed the view that the Court's refusal to compare same sex couples in a PACS with
married couples when same sex marriage is legally forbidden can appear obtuse or even perverse: P Johnson,
Adoption, Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: Gas and Dubois v Franc" (2012)
75(6) Modern Law Review 1123-49, 1147.
68 X and Others vAustrna (n 53) para 153.
69 Ibid para 110.
70 Aleksyev v Russia (n 16) para 83.
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considered both different from and equal to each other: they are sufficiently equal to allow
gays and lesbians to adopt as single parents; and they are different enough to refuse their
applications for adoption as couples.
In conclusion, the Court conceives its homosexual as unequal to the heterosexual subject
and the acceptance of differential treatment in the protection of human rights is the means
by which the existence of a difference is materialised. While the differential treatment is
presented as the logical corollary of the ontological difference between the Court's
homosexual and the heterosexual subject, it is actually through the approved differences that
the Court constructs its homosexual as the necessary inferior counterpart to the heterosexual
subject of human rights. Even though the issues in which the differential treatments are
admitted have a tendency to get narrower, their existence is required, since their complete
absence will jeopardise the differential character of the Court's homosexual and the
privileged status of the heterosexual subject. Consequently, the existence of legal differences,
even contradictory ones, seems to be needed by the Court's case law.
B. COUPLEIUNCOUPLE
The couple/uncouple binary draws attention to the manner in which the Court has decided
that some couples are entitled to the enjoyment of all rights that the status grants, while
others are not recognised as true couples. Between the years 2001 and 2010, the Court
decided a series of nine cases that established that only different-sex couples are to be
considered real ones. The Court has recognised true couples and 'uncoupled' false ones in
cases that concerned: the right to succeed to a tenancy; the right to be exempted from
inheritance tax; the right to benefit from a partner's health insurance; the right to a
survivor's pension or payment; and the right to marry.
The Court dealt with three cases that concerned whether an individual was entitled to
succeed to the tenancy contract of a deceased same-sex partner, or if such a right could be
limited by the state to different-sex partners. On two occasions, the Karner and the Kozak
cases, the Court stated that it was discriminatory to exclude surviving same-sex partners
from the right to continuation of a tenancy.71 The Court affirmed that differential
treatment based on sexual orientation required very serious reasons by way of justification,
however, no compelling arguments had been offered to justify the exclusion of same-sex
partners from the right to continue a tenancy.
72
On the other hand, in the Korelc case, the Court found no discriminatory treatment when
the continuation of a tenancy was refused. The judgment of the Court did not contradict
its previous rulings, since it still rejected the distinction between same-sex and different-sex
couples. However, the Court approved a differential treatment based on the applicant not
being in a long-term sexual relationship with the deceased tenant, but in a relationship based
on economic dependency.73 Therefore, regarding the continuation of a tenancy, the Court
has not ruled out that same-sex couples may be 'true couples': the Court's homosexual can
be in a true couple, as long it is not just based on economic factors.
Similarly, in the PB andJS case, the Court found that an accident and sickness insurance
policy that only covered different-sex partners was incompatible with the prohibition on
discrimination. 74 With explicit reference to the Karner ruling, the Court decided that there
71 Kare rpAupjra (n 51) paras 42 3, Kozak v Polad (n 51) para 99.
72 Kart rvAurna (n 51), paras 37 and 41, Kozak vPolad (n 51) paras 92 and 99.
73 KoreI v Sloveia App no 28456/03 (ECHR 12 May 2009), para 88.
74 PB avdJS v Ausra (n 58) paras 42-4.
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were no reasons justifying a distinction between same-sex and different-sex couples. 75 Once
again, the Court's homosexual could be part of a real couple in terms of entitlement to a
partner's health insurance.
By contrast, the subject of inheritance tax has been used by the Court to draw the line
between being coupled or uncoupled. In the Courten case, the Court analysed whether the
rejection of a tax exemption for the survivor of a same-sex cohabiting couple, who were
legally unable to marry, was discriminatory on the grounds of sexual orientation. The Court
rejected the application, finding that the absence of a legally binding agreement between the
partners made their relationship fundamentally different to that of a married couple or a
civil partnership. The Court also refused to find a violation of the applicant's rights due to
the lack of the legal possibility to enter into such a relationship.76 In other words, only true
couples were allowed tax exemptions and same-sex couples were not coupled enough.
Another criterion distinguishing real from unreal couples is the right to a survivor's
pension. The Court has rejected all three cases in which it was argued that the refusal to
grant a pension or a payment to the survivor of a same-sex couple amounted to
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. When the right to a pension was at
stake, the Court decided to uncouple same-sex partners.
The first of these decisions was adopted in the year 2001 in Mara Esevef, in which the
Court stated that same-sex couples did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for
family life. 77 In fact, the Court understood that states, through the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the rights to a survivor's pension, were actually protecting 'the family based
on marriage bonds'. 78 The second of these rulings was in the MWcase, in which the Court
basically reiterated the criteria used in Courten. The only difference was that this time the
Court rejected a claim for a bereavement payment from the survivor of a same-sex
cohabiting couple instead of a tax exemption. 79 Lastly, in the Manenc case, the Court dealt
with the refusal of a survivor's pension despite the actual existence of a PACS between the
couple. With explicit reference to Mara Esevez! the Court affirmed that still in the year 2010
states were allowed to differentiate between the legal benefits conferred upon same-sex and
different-sex couples. 80
With these judgments, the Court started constructing an unstable border between real
and unreal couples. The Court's homosexual is recognised as part of a true couple in certain
situations, to be later uncoupled by the Court in seemingly similar circumstances. In fact,
the incoherent uncoupling effect that the Court has attributed to certain rights has already
been highlighted by some of the judges of the Court. Only a week after the Court used the
Mara Esevez case as a precedent for the Manenc ruling, three of the judges stated that Mara
Esevez was not only incompatible with the Convention in the year 2010 but that it was
already wrong at the moment of its adoption. 81 Consequently, the Court's homosexual
seems to alternate uneasily between both sides of the couple/uncouple binary, while the
unstable limit of the dichotomy is being re-inscribed by the Court.
Only one strict dividing line between real and unreal couples seems to exist: marriage.
In the Schalk and Kopf case, the Court decided that the Convention did not grant everyone
75 PB aJS Austria (n 58) para 44.
76 Coz ,ei v UKApp no 4479/06 (ECHR 4 November 2008), para 65.
77 Mara EteveZ v Spaiu App no 56501/00 (ECHR 10 May 2001).
78 Ibid.
79 MW P UKApp no 11313/02 (ECHR 23 June 2009).
80 MaN , r ra , App no 66686/09 (ECHR 21 September 2010).
81 JM v UK (n 62), concurring opinion of Judges Garlicki, Hirvela and Vuinic.
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the right to marry, since states were free to grant access to such a right solely to different-
sex couples.82 The Court also affirmed that the rights conferred on same-sex registered
partnerships might differ from those conferred on married couples, without amounting to
discriminatory treatment. 83
The Court decided to formulate the case as a dilemma involving two of its historical
opinions: should it keep the understanding of marriage as the legal union of a heterosexual
man and a heterosexual woman? Or, should it continue to interpret the Convention in the
light of present-day conditions, opening marriage to the Court's homosexual? In other
words, the Court understood that a choice was needed between safeguarding the
heterosexual privilege and preserving the progressive interpretation of the Convention and
picked the first option.
The Court abandoned its extensive case law concerning the interpretation of the
Convention in the light of present-day conditions.84 It affirmed that: 'regard must be had
to the historical context in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s marriage was
clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners of different
sex'. 85 Therefore, in order to draw a specific line between real and unreal couples, the Court
decided to travel 60 years back in time.
The Court's ruling seems to be consistent with the homosexual that has been
constructed in the case law. This judgment reinforced the inferior character of the Court's
homosexual through the denial of rights. However, it also meant that the Court missed an
opportunity to strengthen the traditional institution of marriage. Allowing the sexuality of
the Court's homosexual to enter this institution would have certainly reinforced the idea of
marriage as the true model for legitimate sexuality. By contrast, through the exclusion of the
homosexual, the Court validated the idea that legitimate sexuality exists both inside and
outside the institution of marriage.
Furthermore, seemingly as a trade-off, the Court decided to state that, even though
same-sex couples could not enjoy the right to marry, they could at least be considered
included within the notion of 'family'. The Court said that a cohabiting same-sex couple
living in a stable partnership should be recognised as a 'family', just as the relationship of a
different-sex couple in the same situation would be.86 This particular statement was also
reiterated the very next month in the PB and JS ruling.87 Nonetheless, it is still not clear
whether this statement will truly have any significant legal effects, or if the legal content of
'family' has actually been emptied by the Court. In fact, less than two months after
becoming 'families', same-sex couples were again denied the enjoyment of the right to a
survivor's pension, in the Manenc case.
82 Schalk aud KopJ vAusra (n 49) para 108.
83 Ibid paras 109 10. However, this statement might not be compatible with the Burdeu judgment issued by the
Grand Chamber, in which a clear analogy is made between married couples and those in a registered civil
partnership: Burde v UKApp no 13378/05 (ECHR [Gq 29 April 2008), para 65.
84 FreTv Frane (n 64) para 34, EB vFrane (n 49) para 46.
85 Schalk avd Koptv Ausria (n 49) para 56.
86 Ibid para 94
87 PB avdJS vAustria (n 58) paras 28 30.
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In conclusion, same-sex couples can be placed on any side of the unstable
couple/uncouple binary, depending on the circumstances. 88 Even though the Court has
recently allowed its homosexual to be a part of a legal family, same-sex couples will still be
uncoupled through the denial of the right to marry, survivors' pensions and tax exemptions.
Consequently, only couples formed by two heterosexual subjects are necessarily recognised
as real, since the Court grants only them the full enjoyment of all human rights.
5 A possible way forward? (Self/Other)
The developing case law of the Court has shaped the lesser value of its homosexual through
the denial of an equal enjoyment of human rights. As stated at the outset, the Court's
homosexual has been constructed following the exclusionary process that only allowed
him/her to become the Other, an inferior counterpart of the heterosexual subject. 89
The Court's homosexual, as the Other, is needed for the reinforcement of the
heterosexual individual as the norm(al). The heterosexual is the ideal person entitled to the
human rights recognised by the Convention, while the homosexual Other deserves a
treatment that is similar, but is not the same. Most rights should be graciously granted to
the Court's homosexual, but the majoritarian heterosexual consensus will decide the limit
to such concessions. As long as his/her character of Other is needed for the delimitation
of the human rights subject, the Court's homosexual will never be able to become a true
legal subject.
In fact, the Court ensured that the foundational text of the system remains heterosexual
when it affirmed that the right to marry was conceived that way.90 With that ruling, the
Court made an invaluable contribution to heterosexual privilege. It confirmed that only the
heterosexual is the true subject of human rights and the Court's homosexual can only be
conceived as its inferior opposite counterpart. The Court strategically presented itself as
forced by its constitutional treaty to recognise the heterosexuality of human rights, placing
the heterosexuality of human rights as a topic beyond any possible discussion.
Currently, the Court supports contradictory statements, which can only be coherently
held together by the understanding that the Court's homosexual is the equal that reassures
the uniqueness of the heterosexual. It is as equal as the Other can be. It deserves the legal
equality that allows the Court to approve differential treatment and only in certain
circumstances provide true sexual indifference.
The Court held to be true that a difference based on sexual orientation was
discriminatory in itself,91 while at the same time it allowed a wide margin of appreciation
for the states to adopt differential treatment based on sexual orientation. 92 In 40 rulings, the
Court has shown a (lack of) legal coherence that allows affirming that the Court's
88 The uneasy limit separating the couple/uncouple binary reappeared recently in the Val/iavaros avd Othen case
against Greece. In this ruling, the Court analysed the introduction of civil partnerships in Greece and decided
that, because this legal institution was restricted to different sex couples, it was discriminatory against same
sex couples. However, before reaching this decision, the Court felt the need to clarify that it was not ruhng
that states were under the obligation to provide for a form of legal recognition for same sex couples, but it
was only stating that when a state decides to offer couples the possibility to enter into a civil partnership it
cannot limit this right to different sex couples: Vallianaos and Others v Greece App nos 29381/09, 32684/09
(ECHR [Gq 7 November 2013), paras 75 and 90 2.
89 Butler (n 7) xiii.
90 Schalk and Kopf vAustia (n 49).
91 Kozak v Polavd (n 51) para 92, EB v France (n 49) para 93, GevderdocM vMoldova (n 41) para 51, X and Others v
Austra (n 53) para 99.
92 Aleksev v Russia (n 16) para 83.
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homosexual is both an equal who should not be treated differently and the Other whom
states can differentiate from the heterosexual subject.
What the Court has so far not shown its homosexual is enough indifference for his/her
sexuality to become as legally irrelevant as the sexual orientation of the heterosexual subject.
Since the law has a normalising effect on the construction of sexual identities, 93 making
homosexuality legally irrelevant will subtract the binary sexualised individual from this
disciplinary regime. In other words, legal indifference to individuals' sexuality would put a
stop to the regulatory power exercised by the Court on the performative character of sexual
identities. If, in the future, the Court decides to let its homosexual become an authentic
subject of human rights, the homosexual's sexual orientation will have to become irrelevant.
That day, the homosexual Other will become the 'Self', binaries will be transcended and the
homosexual subject will necessarily disappear from the Court's case law.
6 Conclusion
The Court's homosexual is over 30 years old and his/her presence in the Court's case law
will probably continue in the years to come. The analysis performed in this article has
shown how the Court has exercised the regulatory power of the law to construct its
homosexual subject. Starting from a categorical conception of sexuality and through the
concession and denial of human rights, the Court has created its homosexual as the needed
inferior counterpart of the heterosexual subject.
It is true that the Court's homosexual has seen his/her original status of private
subject modified, having gained the right to step outside the closet into the public sphere.
However, this alleged improvement has been coupled with different restrictions on the
enjoyment of rights, as necessary measures that allow the re-affirming of the privileged
status of the heterosexual subject. In particular, the Court's decision to (hetero)sexualise
the Convention has secured the heterosexual subject as the only one entitled to the full
enjoyment of human rights.
Nonetheless, the inferior legal status granted by the Court to its homosexual could easily
be modified by amendment of the Court's case law.94 A jurisprudence that enforces
indifference towards the sexual orientation of the human rights subject will necessarily
cause the disappearance of both the Court's homosexual and its privileged counterpart. In
fact, a strategy based on indifference can help avoid the reinforcement of the fixed sexual
identities questioned by queer theory.
This potential disappearance of the Court's homosexual would contribute to reducing
the regulatory power of the Court over individuals' sexual bodies, but it would certainly not
exhaust the applicability of queer theory to the analysis of the Court's case law. In fact,
human rights law, as a discourse that holds a claim to universality in the entitlement to rights,
could take further advantage of the ability of queer theory to continuously interrogate the
process of exclusion.
93 Morgan (n 4) 217 18 Zanghellini (n 6) 6.
94 In this sense this work distances itself from the position adopted by Michele Grigolo concerning the need to
delete Article 12. Grigolo (n 3) 1042. As stated through the analysis of the Scha/k and Kop fcase (n 49), the
wording of Article 12 could be easily re interpreted by the Court to include same sex marriage. In fact, the
Article could be re interpreted in so many different ways so as to read, if desired, different sex marriage, same
sex marriage, or group marriage. Moreover, since the Article does not impose a definition of marriage, this
institution could be recreated within the Convention in any imaginable way.
